【时间】5月15日（周五）下午2:00

【地点】经院302教室

【嘉宾】谢阳，2010年从清华经管本科毕业，现在正在UC Berkeley农业与资源经济系攻读博士学位。他的研究方向是政治经济学和资源经济学。研究方法侧重理论建模，兼顾史料分析、数值模拟和统计计量。他的研究内容包括政策试验的决策机制、文化和社会规范在群体行为中的作用、中欧政治史比较以及气候变化背景下水利建设和用水效率提高之间的政策组合。

【题目】Machiavellian Experimentation（马基雅维利式的政策实验，合作者：谢寅玺）

【摘要】 Motivated by the choice of strategy during decisive moments in history, we analyze a common situation of collective decision making in the presence of heterogeneous beliefs in which any decision other than the default option requires unanimity. We note that, when heterogeneous beliefs exist, decision makers could be rewarded or punished for being proven correct or incorrect by experimentation. We show that, when decision makers care strongly about potential rewards and punishments, they will agree to experimentation if, and only if, they have diametrically opposite beliefs, but not if they hold moderate beliefs. We illustrate our model with two examples: the disagreement within the leadership of the Allied Forces on the Western Front of World War II in the autumn of 1944 and the decision making process of the Chinese leadership during the country's transition starting in the late 1970s.

北大经院院级Seminar协调人   吴乐旻